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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
V-1 OIL COMPANY,
a corporation

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 8878

ANCHOR PETROLEUM
COMPANY,
Respondent.

REPLY B'RIEF OF PETITIONER ON
INTERMEDIATE APPEAL

THE ISSUE HERE GOES SOLELY TO THE LAW;
THE FACTS ARE NOT AT ISSUE.

The issue your petitioner brings to this Court
is whether the parties are, under the law of contract, bound by the terms of their written agreement or may the respondent modify the terms thereof by:
I. A letter of transmittal accompanying the
return of the executed contract of even date.
1
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II. Conversation and telephonic communications had prior to the execution by respondent of
the writing.
III. Parol evidence as to matters outside the
writing.
IV. A denial that the writing expresses the
agreement made all in the absence of an allegation
of fraud or mistake; and
V. Disaffirmance of his signed agreement to
take advantage of his own default through use of
the above evidentiary matter which your petitioner
claims inadmissible.
These are issues of law which your petitioner relied upon in the Court below for summary
judgment; once disposed of as a matter of law
there remains no issue of fact to be decided.
Respondent's brief merely reiterates his argument to the Court below that his proffered exhibits
and parol evidence constituted facts to be determined
by a trier of the facts. That was not the question
there nor is it the question here. The question is,
is such evidence admissible under the law of contracts?
In this reply brief we n1ay probably be most
helpful to the Court by examining and briefly commenting upon the authorities upon which respondent relies.
Respondent argues:
2
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POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S LE'TTER OF TRANSMITTAL
WAS A COUN'TER OFFER WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY 'THE DEFENDAN'T.

The question is not vvhat does the letter say,
but is the letter admissible in evidence? Respondent's cited authorities do not go to the issue, they
are:
American Lumber and Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic
Mill and Lumber Co., 290 Fed. 632, 635
In this case the defendant [purchaser] directed
the plaintiff to cancel all unfinished orders; on the
plaintiff's [seller's] refusal to do so, the defendant
[purchaser] declined to accept and pay for further
shipments. Defense was hased upon the contention
that the plaintiff's acc~ptances of the defendant's
,
orders vvere conditional and were for that reason
counter orders and as such were rejections of the
original orders, leaving the minds of the parties
wholly apart. It was found from the evidence in this
case that there was a "conditional acceptance" because of the offeror's assent to new terms imposed
by the offeree in his acceptance - connected with
plaintiff's [seller's] "acceptance" there were new
matters not touched upon in the defendant's [purchaser's] order. The new matters were specific and
material and in writing, which placed the purchaser
upon notice that the order was "accepted" subject
3
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to such conditions. The Court merely held that in
such case the "offeror's assent to new terms imposed
by the offeree in his acceptance may be inferred
from the fact that the parties thereafter proceeded
'to conduct 'business under the conditional acceptance." Under such facts the result of the decision
was that the "purchaser" having adhered to the
"seUer's" conditional acceptance was bound to perform.
Comment: In the case at bar, the "seller" rescinds because of the "purchaser" defaulting in
perform·ance; the petitioner [seller] here by his·
acceptance of the contract did no't impose conditions
of acceptance upon the original contract and the
respondent [purchaser] cannot demand continued
performance by reason of his own default.

Everett v. Emmons Coal Mining Co., 289 Fed.
686.

Comment: This is again a case where the
seller accepted a written order by a written acceptance containing conditions, i.e. :
If the conditions upon which we accept
your order, as shown on the back hereof, are
not satisfactory, please advise us at once, and
we will cancel order; otherwise shipment will
he made subject to these conditions.
And, 'the buyer admitted receipt of such acceptance before shipments were made, and without
4
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dbjection thereafter received shipments. The Court
held that the order and acceptance, with the conditions conta'ined therein, constituted the contract
of sale.
Boston Lumber Co. v. Pendleton Bros., 129 A.
782. This case adheres to the ru1e expressed in the
American Lumber and Manufacturing case, supra,
and gives no solace to respondent here because it is
again a suit for breach of contract to purchase.
Cornment: For the purpose of the controversy
hete, it can be said that this case holds only that:
vVhere a buyer, in confirming a telephonic acceptance of a seller's offer, asked that certain changes
be made to the order and seller replied and enclosed
sales slip stating the terms of the bargain, and the
buyc, thereafter gave shipping instructions, that
the sales slip was binding as against a contention
that the contract was previously complete.

Vaughan's Seed Store, Inc. v. Morris April &
Bros., 7 A. 2d 868. In this case the Court wrote,
in part:
The complaint is in two counts. The first
sets up a debt due from the defendant on a
book account; the second count demanded the
sum claimed on the book account, for goods
sold and delivered "under an agreement between the parties that a reasonable price"
for the goods purchased -- a shipment of
onions - would be paid 'by the defendant.
The defense was that the goods were not
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up to the warranty under which they were
sold in that they were not marketable, were
"defective in quality" and "were not standard.''
At the close of the case the court said
that there was in fact an agreement between
the parties and that the defendant's order
was subject to certain conditions imposed by
the plaintiff which the defendant accepted
and that those conditions expressly excluded
warranty of any kind and, further, that objection to the goods on the buyer's part would
not be entertained unless made within five
days of receipt of the goods; that the defendant admitted that no complaint of any kind
was made until after the five day period had
passed, whereupon the court directed the jury
to find in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant for the amount of the bill. * * *
The defendant, in its opening to the jury,
frankly admitted that it was indebted to the
plaintiff for some amount but that it objected
to paying the whole clahn because the goods
were of inferior quality. But, in our view,
the written acceptance of the defendant's order by the plaintiff and the conditions embodied therein are binding on the defendant.
The acceptance was sent the defendant by
the plaintiff on Nov. 28, 1936. The goods
were shipped F.O.B. Chicago early in February and arrived here on Feb. 9, 1937. No
complaint was made by the buyer until Feb.
15, which was the sixth day after the goods
arrived. * * *
The Appellate Court sustained the lower court
in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
6
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Comment: Another case in which the purchaser "\Vas held to be bound by a provision in the
acceptance.
All of these authorities present fact situations
converse to the case brought to this Court by your
petitioner.
135 ALR 822. On page 5 of respondent's brief,
the following declaration appears:
An expressed as3ent to new terms and
conditions attached to the acceptance of an
offer is not necessary in order to make such
terms and conditions a part of the contract.
Any conduct on the part of the original offerer showing his assent to the modification
of any terms and conditions of the contract
is sufficient to make such modification a part
of the contract. 135 ALR 822.
This annotation upon which respondent relies
goes on to state :
It has been held that mere silence on the
part of the offerer will not constitute an
acceptance by him of added or altered conditions or terms attached to the offeree's acceptance of the original offer, in the absence
of an agreement that silence shall have such
effect, where there is no duty on the part of
the original offerer to reject such conditions
or terms.
Comment: In the case at 'bar it is admitted
that there was no reply to respondent's letter of
September 6, 1954 - the contended for "counter
offer". Silence alone will not constitute an accep7
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tance of added or altered terms attached to the
offeree's acceptance of the original offer, there being no duty on the part of your petitioner, the original offerer, to reject such conditions or terms.
Respondent's Point II:
ASSUMING TH~T THE DEFENDANT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT IS CORRECT, PLAINTIFF, NEVERTI1ELESS, WAS
NOT IN DEFAULT AS THE DEFENDANT HAD
WAIVED THE PROVISIONS AS TO MINIMUM
MON'THLY REQUIREMENTS.

Yours Truly Biscuit Co. v. Chas. H. Lilly Co.,
253 P. 817:
The plaintiff corporation placed its order with the defendant corporation on January 28, 1924, for 2,000 barrels of flour, at a
specified price, to be delivered "as wanted by
April1, 1924."
The order was accepted, and thereafter
prior to April 1 delivery was taken under the
contract of 240 barrels. After the expiration
of the time provided for in the contract, the
plaintiff continued to order, and the defendant to deliver under the contract, additional
flour up until August 25, 1924, at which time
a total of 654 barrels had been delivered. On
September 8, the plaintiff ordered additional
flour under the contract, and was advised that
the contract had been canceled for failure to
accept delivery within the time provided in the
contract. The plaintiff refused to recognize
the cancellation of the contract, and made
demand for the balance of the flour under it,
8
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to wit, 1,235 barrels, vvhich was refused. * * *
The Court held that by continuing deliveries
after April 1st [the expiration of the tin1e provided
in the contract] up until August 25th, the seller
waived the provision of the contract as to time of
delivery.
Comment: This case is not helpful to respondent here for two reasons, (a) this p~titioner did
not sleep on his ·rights, and (b) there is no issue
here as to prolonged deliveries after the expiration
of the time provided in the contract.

Commerce Cas1mlty Co. v. CampjJell, 188 S.E.
36'3.

Comment: This case holds that an insurer by
accepting monthly premiums three weeks after their
due date for more than 30 consecutive months effected a waiver of the provision of the policy relating 'to the payment of premiums; that a provision
against waiver in the policy of insurance could itself be waived.
Jordan v. Madsen, 252 P. 570, 69 U. 11'2. Case
stands for the proposition :
* * * that where a party to a contract,
when the other is not in default, manifests
in unequivocal language his intention not to
perform the contr~act unless it is modified he
thereby breaches the contract and becomes
liable therefor; * * *
Comment: In this case the party not in de9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fault complained of the contracting party who had
repudiated his obligation and refused to meet the
condition, thus breaching his obligation before the
time fixed for performance with the resultant immediate right of action arising in the party not in
default. This result is so firmly grounded upon
reason and justice as to render authorities supel'fluous; vvhen one declares that he \vill not he tound
by his contract the attendant result in law is dbvious. The facts in the case at bar are not such the plaintiff and respondent was not "excused of
performance" at time of notice or at any time until
after notice that because of respondent's breach that
petitioner elected to rescind.
12 Am. Jur., Sec. 392,.p. 970; 17 C.J.S., p. 973,
Sec. 472. Citing these authorities, respondent argues: (Brief, p. 11).
The plaintiff was not in default, when
notified of cancellation of the contract by defendant. 'This was on "anticipatory breach",
which gave the plaintiff an immediate right
of action and excused it of performance on
its part. * * *
Petitioner has no quarrel with these authorities
or with the proposition for which they stand, i.e.:
Strictly an "anticipatory breach" of a
contract is one committed before the time has
come when there is a present duty of performance, and it is the outcome of words or acts
evincing an intention to refuse performance
in the future. Where a party bound by an exe10
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cutory contract repudiates his obligation before the time for performance, the promisee
has, according to the great weight of authority, an option to treat the contract as ended
so far as further performance is concerned,
and to n1aintain an action at once for the
damages occasioned by such anticipatory
breach.
The plain fact is, admittedly, however, that
after the first two n1on'ths and up to the seventeenth
day of the third month, respondent had not performed under the contract and was in default of the
express terms thereof. We have no fact situation
here where your petitioner [defendant] repudiated
his obligation befo~e the time of perfor?rUlnce or at
all until after respondent's default in performance
thereof.
12 Am. Jur., Sec. 343, Page 900.
Con1ment: Further respondent makes the following statement on page 10 of his brief:
The purchase by the defendant in November of 19,599 gallons was a substantia] performance of the contract and, where there is
a substantial performance, it gives no right of
cancellation. (12 Am. Jur., Sec. 343, Page
900).
We respectfully draw the Court's attention to
the fact that plaintiff and respondent received the
cancellation notice on November 19, 1954; that
thereafter on November 21st and November 22nd,
two purchases were made of 6,507 gallons each.
11
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Therefore, 13,014 of the November total purchase
of 19,599 gallons were made after petitioner terminated the contract for non-performance of respondent. The purchase in Novernber of 6,585 prior
to notice of cancellation was by no means a substantial performance.
Respondent's Point III.
IN ANY EVENT, THERE WAS A MODIFICATION OF THE 'TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
AS TO MINilVIUM AND MAXIlVIUM REQUIREMENTS.

For this Point III respondent cites:
12 Am. Jur., Sec. 428, page 1006.
Comment: In his Statement of Facts (p. 2,)
respondent says :
The con tract ( R. 3-5) was forwarded
unsigned to the plaintiff for its signing, provided it met with its approval (Exhibit 2).
Prior to plaintiff's signing it, however, plaintiff's manager talked with defendant by telephone, explaining it could not meet the minimum requirements, because of not having any
customers and a sales organization, and he
was advised tha:t this was of no importance
and that it would furnish him with the material he needed (Dep 10-11). Following this
conversation, the plaintiff signed the contract,

* * *
Then, under his Point III, respondent argues
as follows:
12
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Should this court determine that the contract was subject to the minimum requirement and not modified by the letter of acceptance, plaintiff, nevertheless, urges that it
was subsequently modified by the defendant's
agreeing that the gallonage figures were of
no significance and that it would always
supply him with quantities needed. (Dep.
10-11).
Respondent thus admits that the alleged conversation as to quantities took place before the contract was by him executed; " * * * Following this
conversation, the plaintiff [respondent] signed the
contract * * *." It is also said in 12 Am. Jur., Sec.
428, p. 1006 - relied upon by respondent - that:

* * * The very purpose of the writing is
to render the agreement more certain and to
exclude parol evidence of it. * * *
Respondent's Point IV.
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEN'T
MAY NOT BE GRAN'TED WHERE A GENUINE
ISSUE OF FACTS EXISTS AND DOUBT MUST
BE RESOLVED AGAINST THE M 0 VI N G
PARTY.

Taylor v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, 189 F. 2d
213. Summary judgment was set aside in this case
upon a finding by the Court of Appea1s that a real
issue existed as to whether there had actually been
an antecedent acceptance of challenged orders [for
steel merchandise] upon which plaintiff [salesman]
based his claim for commissions.
13
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Chappel v. Goltsman, 186 F. 2d 215.
Comment: The issue here again goes to the
propriety of a summary judgment; considering the
facts there, that Court wrote :
* * * I't seems clear to us that the basis
of the court's opinion was not that there were
no genuine fact issues, but rather that there
were such issues which it proceeded to decide
adversely to appellants, although the motion
raises questions of in·tent, unfair competition
and perfidious dealings which ought not to
have been disposed of by summary judgment
and without trial on the merits. * * *
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464. This case
holds that where credibility, including that of the
defendant, is crucial, summary judgment becomes
improper and a trial indispensable.
Comment: There is no such issue here. Your
petitioner relies for summary judgment upon the
testimony of plaintiff [respondent] - relying upon
the undisputed testimony of the bringer of the action
and not upon evidence in dispute at all.
Witlin v. Giacalme, 154 F. 2d 20.
Comment: This case adheres to the rule stated
by Professor Moore in his work on Federal Practice
Under the New Federal Rules which is in substance
that motion for summary judgment will be denied
if the opposing papers show a genuine issue of fact.
Such a rule does not meet the issue here in the
absence of evidence which would be admissible.
14
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Parmelee v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 157 F. 2d
582; 168 ALR 1130.
Comment: An action in which the seller attempted recovery for goods sold and delivered and,
the buyer responded with six counterclaims which
did "* * * not present sha1n issues, but issues that
must be tried, and if they arose out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter
of the plaintiff's claim they are a bar to granting
plaintiff's motion under Rule 54, counterclaims
have long been permitted under the various state
statutes governing pleadings. * * *" In such case
the court he1d that summary judgment should not
issue.
Hawkins v. Frick-Reid Supply Corp., 154 F. 2d
88. Here the court said:
It is not the function of the trial court
upon n1otion for summary judgment to try
the issues of fact if, as here, a factual question
is presented. (Emphasis ours.)
The lower court awarded summary judgment
upon the ground that a drill pipe \vas machinery
or machinery parts and not material within the
meaning of the invoice clause. The Appellate Court
examined the definitions of "material" and "machinery" and wrote:
When we come to apply these definitions
to the drill pipe here under consideration, we
must walk with a question mark in each hand.
It is referred to in the record as a "string of
drill pipe." Certain it is tha:t when it becomes
15
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attached to a line of pipe in a well with a
rotary drill it becomes machinery, but apart
and before being attached it may be material.
* * *
Toebelrnan v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.,
130 F. 2d 1016. Stockholder's derivative suit for
misfeasance and accounting of funds spent. Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment dismissing
the suit. For purposes here the case stands for the
proposition that:
It is now well settled that summary judgment may be entered for either party if the
pleadings, depositions, admissions on file and
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is enti tied to a judgment as a matter of
law. Civil Procedure Rule 56. Stated conversely, a substantial dispute as to a material
fact forecloses summary judgment. * * * Upon
a motion for a summary judgment it is no
part of the court's function to decide issues
of fact but solely to determine whether there
is an issue of fact to be tried. * * * (Emphasis
added).
CONCLUSION
Under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Summary Judgment will always issue when there
are no facts such as would be admissible in evidence.
(Rule 56 (e) ) .
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorneys for Petitioner
and Appellant
16
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